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Macrocognition in Day-To-Day Police
Incident Response
Chris Baber* and Richard McMaster
School of Engineering, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Using examples of incidents that UK Police Forces deal with on a day-to-day basis,
we explore the macrocognition of incident response. Central to our analysis is the idea
that information relating to an incident is translated from negotiated to structured and
actionable meaning, in terms of the Community of Practice of the personnel involved
in incident response. Through participant observation of, and interviews with, police
personnel, we explore the manner in which these different types of meaning shift over
the course of incident. In this way, macrocognition relates to gathering, framing, and
sharing information through the collaborative sensemaking practices of those involved.
This involves two cycles of macrocognition, which we see as ‘informal’ (driven by
information gathering as the Community of Practice negotiates and actions meaning)
and ‘formal’ (driven by the need to assign resources to the response and the need to
record incident details). The examples illustrate that these cycles are often intertwined,
as are the different forms of meaning, in situation-specific ways that provide adaptive
response to the demands of the incident.
Keywords: macrocognition, sensemaking, police, incident response
INTRODUCTION
We consider Police incident response as a form of macrocognition (Klein et al., 2003). The primary
research question relates to the manner in which a collection of individuals, a ‘community of
practice’ (Wenger et al., 2002), develop a common understanding of the problem that they are
addressing through processes of sensemaking. We propose that sensemaking can be a collaborative
activity within a given community of practice. This activity is shaped by the institutional frames
of the community of practice, which define the formal and informal rules by which information
is defined and shared. These rules can be seen in the manner in which the community of
practice manages ‘meaning’, in its collaborative sensemaking. We consider three types of meaning,
which we term ‘negotiated’ (in which informal, unstructured accounts of the incident are shared
and clarified), ‘structured’ (in which formal accounts are logged), and ‘actionable’ (in which the
commentary on the incident informs decisions on how to resource and manage the response). For
this paper, a key issue in macrocognition, therefore, relates to this question of how these different
meanings are recognized and managed.
In terms of ‘community of practice’, the incidents that we consider involve Standard Operating
Procedures. This means that there is an established organization of individuals, operating within
a well-defined domain, and who “. . .share a common set of patterns of interpretation, implicit
assumptions, and beliefs. . .” (Burnett et al., 2004, p. 12). The manner in which a Community
of Practice shares its knowledge and understanding involves what we have previously called
Collaborative Sensemaking (Duffy and Baber, 2013), which combines ‘semantic’ sensemaking (in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 293
fpsyg-07-00293 March 8, 2016 Time: 12:31 # 2
Baber and McMaster Macrocognition in Incident Response
which a group of people seek to develop a common interpretation
of an event, i.e., determining what is known) and ‘pragmatic’
sensemaking (in which a group of people can be allocated
different roles in terms of holding or sharing information, i.e.,
determining who knows what).
From the point of view of ‘pragmatic sensemaking’, a
Community of Practice shares information partly through
common jargon (and associated experience and ‘world view’)
and partly through shared communication technologies and
practices. An irony of this (for the type of incident response
considered in this paper) is that ‘outsiders’ (i.e., people who are
not part of the Community of Practice) are the very focus of its
activity. One implication of this is that there is a need to develop
and manage a wide range of ‘interfaces’ between the Community
of Practice and those outside it. These interfaces could be formal,
e.g., in terms of Press conferences or briefings to politicians,
or informal, e.g., in terms of reassuring members of the public.
Central to these interfaces is the need to define the ‘meaning’ of
an incident at the most appropriate level of detail.
The information sources provide frames (Klein et al., 2006a,b,
2007) for interpreting and responding to the incident. Of
particular interest are the institutional frames that are designed
to aid the management and recording of incidents, such as the
electronic forms that allow call handlers to enter information into
incident logs. These electronic forms are a repository of prior
experience of the organization; they reflect the primary types of
incident to which responses are required and the primary types
of information that need to be recorded in order to produce
consistent, structured accounts of the incident and the response.
In addition to these electronic forms, other types of institutional
frame are the policies that local police forces might enact, either in
response to National policy or in response to local crime patterns.
These policies could emphasize the importance of prioritizing
response to some types of incident. Finally, institutional frames
could come from the collective experience of the personnel
involved in incident response, i.e., the community of practice of
incident responders, in terms of expectations of how an incident
might develop.
The notion that institutional frames can influence decision
making echoes the question posed by Manning (1988), viz.
“How does organized rationality interface with the variegated
dilemmas and perplexities of human communication?” (p. xv).
Our reading of this question is in terms of the potential
conflict between the Naturalistic Decision Making that personnel
involved in incident response will apply and the ‘rules’ that
are embedded in the forms and procedures that they apply.
For Manning (1988), these ‘rules’ might be informal, reflecting
concerns of Police Officers, Incident Controllers and Call
Handlers (in terms of acceptable ways of behaving on and
off duty) and which we see as constituting the community of
practice of incident response. Additionally, the ‘rules’ might be
formal and dictate how information is recorded, shared and
acted upon, i.e., as institutional frames. From the perspective
of macrocognition, this patchwork of ‘rules’ will influence
the space in which information is interpreted, and the ways
in which different ‘framing’ of the same information can
vary.
Incident Response and Macrocognition
Incident response has been extensively researched for major and
catastrophic incidents (Dynes, 1970; Quarantelli, 1999; Boin,
2004; Mendonça et al., 2007; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2008; von
Lubitz et al., 2008; McMaster and Baber, 2012). There has been
less work on the routine incidents that emergency services face
on a day-to-day basis (e.g., Blandford and Wong, 2004, explored
Situation Awareness of operators in medical dispatch). Incident
response tends to follow a standard process in which a call
is received by a Call Handler, responding units are dispatched
by the Incident Controller and these units attend and resolve
the incident, and the incident in closed. Over the course of
this process, an Incident Log is maintained to record relevant
information and personnel communicate with each other (via
radio) and with members of the public (via telephone or face-to-
face).
Figure 1 illustrates core processes and functions related to
macrocognition. The processes {detecting problems, managing
risk, managing uncertainty, coordinating} are central to incident
response. Indeed, these are the primary processes involved in
this activity (the only addition here is the process of managing
the Incident Log – which we will argue is an essential part
of incident response, not only in terms of recording what has
been done but also as part of the coordinating process). In
terms of the functions, we will present examples of incident
response to show how the situations and prior experiences of
personnel involved in the response can exhibit characteristics of
Naturalistic Decision Making and Sensemaking. We have less to
say on Insight and Complex Learning in this paper (although
both can play important roles in the response to incidents and
handling of crime).
FIGURE 1 | Processes and functions in macrocognition [from
Schraagen et al., 2008].
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Central to the activity of the Incident Controller is the
need to ensure an optimal resource has been dispatched to
the incident: too few officers and there might be a risk to the
officers or the public, or they might be unable to apprehend the
suspect; too many and there could be problems in resourcing
subsequent calls. As Blandford and Wong (2004) note, the
decisions governing how to resource a response is as much a
matter of situation awareness as it is of policy, and the situation
awareness includes not only the location and availability of units
which could respond but also the type of response which is
required.
METHODOLOGY
Over the course of 5 years, the second author worked as
a Special Constable (volunteer officer) for a Police Force in
the UK. During this time he received training on incident
response and attended incidents, working 70 shifts in a two-
officer patrol crew deployed in a marked police vehicle. These
participant observation sessions enabled direct access to the
‘on the ground’ incident response process, something which is
not normally possible for researchers. Informal interviews were
conducted with crewmates after incidents had been resolved;
notes were taken during patrols whenever possible. These were
later supplemented with electronic incident logs for timings and
other details. In addition, permission was granted to collect
data from the communications centers of two Police forces;
over the course of some 30 data collection sessions, we were
able to interview and observe Call Handlers and Controllers
at work, listen in to 999 (emergency) calls and Police radio
traffic, review electronic incident logs. Interviews were done on
an opportunistic basis – with questions tailored to clarify the
activities that had just been observed. During these interview
and observation sessions, data capture was limited to note
taking, which ranged from detailed descriptions of activities
being undertaken to verbatim recording of telephone and radio
conversations.
Such access resulted in a wealth of material. However, this
leads to the inevitable problem of deciding what material
to select and report. While it is tempting to select those
incidents in which there is some level of excitement or
novelty, this does not reflect day-to-day operations. On the
other hand, some of the more common incidents reveal
little of interest about the nature of incident response.
For example, a spate of incidents in which gardening
equipment was stolen from sheds in back yards might
take up a sizeable portion of time but does not make for
interesting reading. Typical examples of day-to-day incidents
include:
• Burglaries in progress;
• Criminal damage (including arson);
• Domestic violence;
• Medical emergencies (including suicidal and acute mental
health problems);
• Retail thefts;
• Road traffic incidents
• Serious assaults;
• Street robberies;
• Urgent welfare concerns (e.g., elderly and disabled persons
collapsed in their homes);
• Vehicle crime (e.g., theft from, theft of and driving
offenses).
These different types of incident present a range of challenges
and risks to the public and responding Officers. Thus, the type
of incident will dictate the approaches that are used to respond
to them (Flin et al., 2007). For this paper, we have selected a
set of incidents that reflect the need for immediate attendance
with the opportunity of arresting the suspect (burglaries in
progress) or the need to attend the scene to provide assistance
(street robbery). We make no claims as to how representative
these incidents are of day-to-day policing; we estimate that such
incidents would occur three or four times a week, rather than
daily, but they represent examples of incidents that those involved
would recognize as common. Furthermore, we have chosen not to
report incidents which involve violence to the person or domestic
violence that contains details which are harrowing and difficult to
read.
We present the incidents in two ways. The first is through
the use of short vignettes, in which excerpts from incident logs,
or verbatim transcripts of radio traffic, are taken from a single
incident. The incident transcripts reflect as much information
as we feel is necessary for the reader to appreciate what is
being discussed or recorded, while also respecting the need to
maintain a degree of anonymity in the recorded information. The
second is in the form of graphical depictions, which represent the
distillation and interpretation of multiple observations and thus
are general descriptions of the macrocognitive activities being
described. These presentations complement one another, with the
vignettes helping the reader to view the diagrams, which in turn
provide a framework within which the activity described in the
vignettes takes place.
Given the opportunity to collect data in this manner, it is
appropriate to ask whether alternative approaches could have
been feasible or produced more reliable data. We opted for a
participant observation and interview-based approach, with the
primary focus on the Police officers and associated staff and
the processes that they follow. This means that, in comparison
with an ethnographic approach (Hammersley and Atkinson,
1995), this study is heavily prescribed by the information
flow and operating procedures. Our descriptions show how
information is received, processed and passed around the system.
What we are not capturing in detail are the assumptions,
attitudes and expectations of the personnel involved (or, for
that matter, the members of the public who are the subject
of these processes). Thus, while the examples used in the
paper involve researchers participating in the social practices
under investigation, the process-oriented analysis could miss the
rationalization through which the participants continually revise
their understanding of the situations they encounter. In other
words, we are taking the behavior of participants as indicative of
the processes that they follow and then inferring the ‘meaning’
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that these processes involve. Where practicable we have sought to
corroborate our interpretation of meaning with the participants,
but the study is not focused on extracting notions of sense
and meaning directly from the participants. We believe that
the approach taken provides opportunity to triangulate data
(through multiple sources of information being collected for
each example), investigator (through continued exploration of
assumptions made by the two authors in their analysis) and
theory (through developing an explanation of the processes that
we are observing).
Coding, Synthesizing, and Representing
the Data
For the textual descriptions of the incident, the presentation
format is to use CAPITALS to indicate material typed in to the
Incident Log (with time of entry on the left), i.e.,
14:20 Controller 1: “THE IP HAS BEEN STRUCK AND FELL
TO THE FLOOR”
and for verbal communications to be presented in italics, i.e.,
Whiskey 3–5: “Yes – confirmed break-in.”
In the examples in this paper, the textual descriptions are
verbatim accounts recorded in vivo.
The graphical description was originally developed in
McMaster and Baber (2005) and is intended to show how
cognitive activity in spread across actors and artifacts. Table 1
lists features of the activity and which can be used as the basis
of a simple task analysis.
The features from Table 1 are combined into a diagram
which shows the flow of information in an incident response
(Figure 2). The diagram shows the key transformations of
information (e.g., from one modality or storage medium to
another). Thus, Figure 2 shows the process through which an
Incident Controller (in the first panel) responds to an open
Incident Management System (IMS) log for an incident requiring
immediate attendance, and then puts out a call to all units to ask
for attendance. Of the units that respond, one unit asks for further
details on the location. As the incident unfolds, the Incident
Controller provides further information relating to access to the
property.
While Figure 2 provides a summary of the incident,
we are aware that such a representation is not without its
TABLE 1 | Features of Activity.
Feature Description
Agents Who is involved (people/artifacts)
Activity The purpose of the operation
Modality Information state (verbal, text, etc.)
Form Language style, abbreviations, etc.
Transmission How is information shared
Transformation How is information acted upon
Storage How is information retained
Resource for action Actions cued by representation
problems. Any description (verbal or graphical) stands or falls
on the comprehensiveness of its content and, consequently,
reflects the selectivity of the analyst. As far as practicable,
we have included those elements of the incident which
were ‘external’, i.e., available to participants in the incident
response, e.g., the content of the Incident Log, verbatim
transcriptions of communications over the radio. This means
that we have not included the reflections, assumptions,
interpretations and other ‘internal’ elements of the responders.
Nor have we provided much in the way of contextual or
situational material for each incident. However, we feel that
the material that we report is sufficient to allow us to draw
conclusions relating to the macrocognition involved in incident
response.
The approach to coding of the examples, in terms of type of
meaning, is explained for each example. In broad terms, where
participants are asking questions or where there is evidence of
confusion, we consider this to be negotiated meaning. Here,
the participants are, we believe, seeking to establish common
ground in order to make sense of the incident. Where participants
are giving direct instructions, we consider this to be actionable
meaning. Here, the participants are either providing information
or instructions that enable other participants to effect an action.
Where information is being typed in to the Incident Log, we
consider this to be structured meaning. Here, the information is
being formatted for subsequent use. As the examples illustrate,
this distinction is not always clear-cut; information might be
structured (in the sense that it is typed in to the Incident Log)
but could also involve negotiation, with participants raising
questions or debating the meaning of the information. We also
note that several of the examples show overlap in the types of
meaning, i.e., it is rarely the case that the incident proceeds
with negotiated meaning at the start, leading to actionable
meaning and then to structured meaning in the final report.
Rather, the incidents appear to shift between these meaning
types.
THE 999 CALL: FROM NEGOTIATED TO
ACTIONABLE MEANING
Whalen and Zimmerman (1990) show Callers often present
imprecise and hesitant openings to their calls. As Baber et al.
(2006) point out, rather than taking a verbatim account of
the Caller’s information, the Incident Controller will translate
this information into a format which is more suited to the
structure of the Incident Log. Thus, one of the roles of the
Call Handler is to negotiate the meaning of the incident with
the Caller. This negotiation is supported by a set of core
questions that Call Handlers are trained to use in order to direct
the conversation and to establish the important facts quickly,
e.g.,
• Call Handler: “Have you been injured?”
• Call Handler: “Where did they go?”
Caller, Call Handler, and Incident Controller develop some
form of common ground (Clarke, 1996). In this concept,
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common ground is “the mutual knowledge, beliefs, and
assumptions shared by the speaker and addressees.” (Clarke, 1996,
p. 247). Clarke’s (1996) concept of common ground proposes that
people draw on three sources of information:
• Perceptual evidence (the experience to which people have
access);
• Linguistic evidence (the words that people are
hearing);
FIGURE 2 | Negotiating meaning: determining the location of an incident.
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• Community evidence (knowledge which
they might believe is shared within a given
community, perhaps as the result of training or
enculturation).
The Caller, Call Handler and Incident, Controller will not have
the same perceptual evidence (the Call Handler and Incident
Controller are removed from the scene that the Caller is
witnessing or recalling). Thus, part of the conversation is aimed
at translating the Caller’s perceptual evidence into actionable
meaning (to support the Incident Controller) and part of the
conversation is aimed at translating the Caller’s perceptual
evidence into structured meaning (to support completion of
the Incident Log). In terms of linguistic evidence, a key role
of the Incident Controller is to translate the words of the
Caller into the terminology used by the Police. For instance,
the description of an offender may change from “white lad” to
“IC1 male”, which is the relevant UK Police National Computer
Ethnicity Classification. Abbreviations and acronyms are also
employed, for example “My car has been stolen” is formalized
within the Police as “Theft of Motor Vehicle”, which is written
as “TOMV”. This terminology and jargon relates to community
evidence. Furthermore, one might find Caller’s seeking to provide
information in a manner which they believe fits the community
knowledge of the Police, e.g., when reporting a car’s registration
number, the Caller might use the ICAO (International Civil
Aviation Organization) alphabet of A, alpha; B, bravo; C, Charlie
etc. because they believe that this is how to report letters of
the alphabet to a Police Officer. Of course, the Caller’s might
not know all of the words used in the ICAO alphabet and
so might use their idiosyncratic versions, such as A, apple; B,
baby etc., but the intent of providing clear definition of letters
over a potentially noisy communication channel remains the
same.
For us, common ground represents the meaning that the
Caller and Call Handler are negotiating during the call, and
which is then translated into structured meaning by the Call
Handler to record onto the IMS so that it could be read
by an Incident Controller, interpreted in terms of actionable
meaning, and subsequently communicated over the radio to
responding units. In terms of macrocognition, ‘common ground’
implies the need for a community of practice to work within
its institutional frames to gather the appropriate ‘community
evidence’, i.e., that information is selected which corresponds
to working practices and which has been recorded in an
acceptable. The processes by which information is selected
and recorded relate to our notions of ‘meaning’. Figure 2
illustrates some of the issues surrounding common ground
in incident management. In response to an initial call, the
Incident Controller issues a ‘Request for attendance’ to the
incident at ‘x road’. The first response to this request is to
ask ‘where abouts is that?’ to which the Incident Controller
provides further geographical information. Here, the relevant
information is being explored and elaborated in a form of
negotiated meaning. As Attending Officers reach the address,
the Incident Controller provides further information about the
geography (‘. . .an alleyway leading to the back of the house. . .’).
In this example, the unfolding activity can be seen as the effort
after actionable meaning, i.e., to provide sufficient information
to the Attending Officers to allow them to operate at that
address.
The incident summarized in Figure 2 has an Incident Log
entry of “no dog”, indicating that it is not possible to supply
a police dog to this call. In order to make these decisions, the
Incident Controller draws on the incident classification made by
the Call Handler in response to the original call and recorded
the Incident Log. Often the classification (and required response)
is negotiated through the editing of the Incident Log as the
response unfolds. What we find particularly interesting is the
decision of what to include in the Incident Log; when the
Incident Controller (and Call Handler) speaks to Attending
Officers, members of other services or members of the public,
what is recorded is not a verbatim account but as accurate
a gist of the conversation as is sufficient for the log. At this
level, macrocognition applies to the translation of negotiated
meaning (i.e., the content of conversations which might require
clarification) into structured meaning (i.e., which can be written
into the Incident Log).
Figure 3 summarizes the process of taking a 999 call
arising from a street robbery. The boxes on the right-hand
side of the figure show the information that is recorded
in the notepad and incident log at various points, showing
how the incident log gradually develops during the course
of the call. The figure also illustrates how the log structures
the incident details and mediates indirect communications
between the Call Handler and Control (the Call Handler can
see that Control has dispatched a unit to the incident and
is able to tell the Caller that the Police will be with them
soon).
In the incident summarized in Figure 3, the caller provides
initial information about the incident, i.e., “My boyfriend has
been mugged...Two lads...they took his mobile phone.” While
this provides some information about the nature of the incident,
it does not provide information that might be relevant to the
response, such as whether any injuries had been sustained. Thus,
the initial call log records a location and a likely destination
for the perpetrators, i.e., ‘x school’. Again, the aim is to
provide sufficient actionable meaning for the response to be
made.
In the following extract, two Incident Controllers are jointly
handling multiple incidents on the same radio talk group;
they update the same Incident Log relating to the ongoing
reporting of a violent robbery. The timestamps (minutes
and seconds since the start of the call, on the left of the
text) indicate when information is typed into the log; where
there are gaps in the timestamps, e.g., 14:27 to 14:58, this
is likely to be where one of the Controllers is speaking
with the Officer Attending. In this log, two issues are raised
and resolved. The first issue involves concerns with the
victim Injured Party (IP) of an attack and whether or not
an ambulance (Ambo) is needed. The second concerns the
need for Scene of Crime Officers (SOCO) to attend the
scene to gather evidence (which involves notifying a third
controller).
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14:20 Controller 1: “THE IP HAS BEEN STRUCK AND FELL
TO THE FLOOR”
14:27 Controller 1: “OFFICERS CHECKING TO
ASCERTAIN IF AMBO REQUIRED.”
14:58 Controller 2: “LADY HAS BEEN KNOCKED OVER AT
DOOR WHEN OFFENDERS”
15:00 Controller 2: “GAINED ENTRY”
15:15 Controller 1: “CAN SOCO ATTEND ASAP PLSE”
15:30 Controller 1: “FROM OFFICERS THE FEMALE IP
DOES NOT REQUIRE AMBO AS”
15:32 Controller 2: “PLS GET SOCO FOR THIS”
15:39 Controller 1: “IP STATES HAS NO INJURIES”
16:06 Controller 2: “ASKING FOR AMBO ELDERLY
FEEMAL BADLY SHAKEN APPROX”
16:07 Controller 2: “86 YRS”
16:23 Controller 3: Incident Accepted
17:36 Controller 1: “THE OFFICERS NOW ASKING FOR
AMBO AS THE IP 86YRS OLD”
17:51 Controller 1: “IS EXTREMELY DISTRESSED-UPSET”
17:54 Controller 2: “AMBO LOG [Number]”
18:34 Controller 3: “SOCO INFORMED.”
18:40 Controller 3: This incident added to SOCO list for
section [Number]
It is noteworthy that in this example there is no spoken
communication between the three Incident Controllers, two of
whom are co-located. Rather, the updating the Incident Log
provides the development of common ground concerning the
incident. Thus, Controller 1 (15:30) suggests that an ambulance
is not required but subsequently Controller 2 (16:06) disagrees
and requests an ambulance. Both entries are made in response
to comments from the Attending Officers (as indicated in the
Incident Log) and, so the change in entries reflects changes in the
assessment of the situation made at the scene. For Controller 1,
there was no need for the ambulance as the Attending Officers
report that the IP “has no injuries” (15:39) but for Controller
2, they note the age of the IP and the she is “badly shaken”
(16:06). Controller 1 then also logs the request for ambulance as
the IP is “extremely distressed – upset” (17:51). Controller 2 logs
the request for an ambulance to attend (17:54). In this example,
FIGURE 3 | Actionable meaning: determining the nature of a response.
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the updating of the Incident Log provides both a record of the
management of the incident, i.e., structured meaning, that could
provide the basis for subsequent enquiries (i.e., the condition of
the victim could be used as part of the prosecution against the
perpetrator) and negotiated meaning, i.e., in terms of deciding
whether or not to call for an ambulance. The example concludes
with actionable meaning, i.e., an ambulance is called and a Scene
of Crimes Officers is tasked with visiting the scene. What is
particularly pertinent about this example is that way in which the
three types of meaning are interspersed, and the way in which
the negotiation is performed through comments on the Incident
Log rather than through verbal communication (even, as we have
already noted, two of the Incident Controllers are adjacent to each
other in the control room).
ATTENDING OFFICERS TRAVELING TO
THE INCIDENT
As they make their way to the incident, Officers plan their
response in terms of risk (threat assessment), powers and policy,
and tactics. For Borglund and Nuldén (2008) this represents a
form of ‘active traveling’, in which the Officers will not only search
the streets at they drive for vehicles or persons of interest and
for the address to which they have been directed, but also review
experience of previous, similar calls. Although the Officers will
have received some initial details from the Controller, these are
often only the bare minimum, such as an approximate location
and a statement of the nature of the incident, for example "male
being assaulted by two males". In terms of the macrocognitive
process of ‘managing risk’ (Figure 1), the first indication of
the level of risk associated with the incident (both to members
of the public and the responding Officers) and consequently
the appropriate response, will come from the type of incident.
When an offender is named by the Caller, Officers might ask the
Controller to run a check through the Police National Computer;
if the person is known to the police, this will provide a summary
of any previous arrests or convictions, as well as warning markers
(i.e., drugs, violence, weapons or self-harm) associated with those
individuals.
If the Call Handler updates the log as a result of further
conversation with the Caller (e.g., description of an offender, their
direction of travel, vehicle, etc.), this information will be visible to
the Controller, who passes this to the Officers. As a result of these
further updates, the responding units may change their tactics,
for example, if the offender has left the scene Officers may decide
to perform a search of the area before speaking to the victim, in
the hope of catching the offender.
In terms of the macrocognitive processes of ‘managing
uncertainty’ and ‘detecting problems’ (Figure 1), Attending
Officers may ask the Controller to check IMS for: previous
emergency calls to that location, details of any persons associated
with that location and any previous convictions or warning
markers (e.g., for violence or weapons) associated with those
individuals. For example, the IMS will indicate if previous 999
calls have been made from a number, or if any persons named
in a log are associated with previous incidents at that address. In
their analysis of Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) use, Branaghan
et al. (2010) identified five main clusters of information which
could inform decision making of Attending Officers: Potentially
Violent, Citizen Welfare, Medical, Traffic, Non-violent. These
relate to the macrocognitive demands related to managing
uncertainty, managing risk and detecting problems, and could
the subject of discussion between Attending Officers and Control,
or amongst Officers in a talk group.
Officers will often rely on Controllers to remind them of
incident details that they have forgotten – such as house numbers,
names, or vehicle registration numbers – radioing the Controller
as they near the scene to request that that information is repeated.
In Figure 2, an Officer asks for some clarification of where
the incident location was, and then asks for the name of the
company to be repeated. The Controller has pro-actively checked
the location using the GIS (Geographical Information System)
and, unprompted, provides information to clarify the incident
location, i.e., in terms of the ‘alleyway’ to the back of the
house.
ATTENDING OFFICERS AT THE SCENE
As they arrive at the scene, responding Officers notify the
Controller (who updates the incident log); the Officers may be
confronted by an ongoing incident, or they may find that the
immediate threat from the incident has stopped. Their response
to the incident is concerned with: (i) controlling and resolving
the situation, and (ii) performing an initial investigation of the
events surrounding the incident. Where more than one Officer
is deployed to an incident, they may decide to separate and
divide tasks between them (e.g., conducting searches, separating
belligerent parties, speaking to witnesses), using their radios in
point to point mode (i.e., direct one to one) to coordinate their
activities without taking up airtime on the talk group.
In terms of the macrocognitive process of ‘managing
uncertainty’ (Figure 1), responding to incidents is complicated by
the fact that many of the incident details may well be inaccurate,
including the caller’s account of events, the names or descriptions
of parties involved and very often the nature of the incident itself
(i.e., the frame selected by the Call Handler during the initial call).
In the following example, multiple units respond to reports of
a break-in in progress at night; Officers are on the scene within
3 min, however, on their arrival, the property and surrounding
houses appear to be secure and undisturbed, casting doubt on the
nature of the incident. The Controller switches the incident log
back to the Call Hander (in a different Control Room) to double
check the address. The situation Officers encounter at the scene
is at variance to the summary they have been given, which, in
turn, cues activity from the Controllers and Call Handler, who
communicate with each other via the IMS (12:46 to 13:28).
12:46 Controller A: “CAN YOU CONFIRM x RD OR x ST”
13:00 Call Handler: “STANDBY”
13:23 Call Handler: “I HAVE LISTEND TO TAPE AGAIN IT
IS x STREET”
13:28 Call Handler: “NOT ROAD - MY APOLOGIES”
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13:28 Controller A: [Receives no reply from caller’s mobile
phone.]
14:10 Controller B: [Updates caller details to x Street]
14:16 Controller A: [Updates incident location to x Street]
15:20 Controller B: [Notes that the house numbers in x Street
only go up to 12 – the caller had reported
living at number 15]
15:50 Controller B: [Performs searches for the caller on the
Electoral Role database]
17:20 Call Handler: “I HAVE LISTEND TO ALL THE TAPE
AND WHEN I CONFIRM”
17:34 Call Handler: “THE NUMBER OF THE ADDRESS
CALLER STATES x ROAD”
17:44 Call Handler: “I REPEATED IT TO HIM AND HE SAID
YES x ROAD”
17:54 Call Handler: “AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TAPE
HE STATES x”
18:06 Call Handler: “STREET”
21:50 Controller B: [Notes that Officers have checked the
front and rear of both 12 x St and 12 x
Rd and spoken to resident at 12 x St – all
in order.]
24:50 Controller B: [All units are leaving the scene. The log
is closed, having been redefined as a false
call.]
While we have presented the types of meaning as
related to common ground, this does not guarantee that
all communications are correct or complete. The notion of
negotiated meaning that we are developing in this paper
suggests that it is possible for a community of practice to
carry more than one interpretation of a situation. These
multiple interpretations could arise from problems with the
structured information, e.g., in the previous example, the
problem was whether the address was ‘road’ or ‘street’. As soon
as it became apparent that the incident could not be resolved,
it was closed as a ‘false call’. In this example, the ‘common
ground’ was not necessarily agreement on the address so much
as agreement on the nature of the call (and how to respond
to it).
In exceptional circumstances, the talk group becomes an open
forum for a group of responding Officers to collaboratively
make sense of an incident. This extract shows part of the
radio communications during the response to a ‘break-in in
progress’ (burglary), where several Officers were already at
the scene, searching for the offender and other resources
were en route. As can be seen, Officers are using the
talk group to directly communicate in order to coordinate
their response, with the Controller playing an ancillary,
rather than leading role. Interestingly, although the Sergeant
involved provides some leadership to the other units – for
example directing units during the search – none of the
units involved in the example is demonstrably ‘in charge’ of
coordinating the response. Instead, the units involved jointly
make sense of and determine the response to the incident
(break-in in progress) and the situation as they find it. This
also shows that the Controller has to repeat the incident
details several times, either because a new unit has become
involved (Dog Handler), or because details have been forgotten
(Whiskey 2).
W3–5 [Sergeant]: “[OFFICER A]: you’re on the wrong
side. . ..Unit looking at me, go down there.”
Dog Handler: “You were calling me?”
Control: “Possible Break in progress...” [Gives
details]
Dog Handler: “Can you confirm I’m required?”
Whiskey 3–5: “Yes – confirmed break-in.”
. . .
Whiskey 2: “Whiskey 2: What’s the address again?”
Control: “[ADDRESS]”
[Confusion ensues over the location of the
road and property]
Control: “On mapping, you have got [ROAD]...”
Officer A: “I’m by [LOCATION], is that right?”
Officer B: “No, it’s further round, near the church....do
a left there.”
Officer C: “[OFFICER C] to 3-5.”
Whiskey 3–5: “Go on.”
Officer C: “Can you speak to the IP and see if a laptop’s
been stolen?”
Whiskey 3–5: “Confirmed.”
Officer C: “I’ve found a laptop cable...”
Whiskey 3–5: “Does that give a direction of travel?”
Officer C: “It goes to a dead end...”
Whiskey 1: “Whiskey 1 to Control?”
Control: “Go ahead.”
Whiskey 1: “Another property is open, [OFFENDER]
may still be inside.”
Whiskey 3–5: “[Requests location of this address]”
Whiskey 1 “...outside IP’s address, go back...2nd right...”
In this example, the different threads of conversation show
interconnections between different types of meaning. The
negotiated meaning develops over the course of response, e.g., in
terms of tasking (‘can you confirm I’m required?’, ‘see if a laptop’s
been stolen?’) and in terms of location (‘what’s the address gain?’,
‘is that right?’, ‘it goes to a dead end. . .’). Incident Controller
(Control) is providing information to Attending Officers, in the
form of the specific location of the incident. The Attending
Officers are sharing information with Control (‘another property
is open [Offender] may still be inside’). This example captures
some of the confusion of incident response, with the need to
define the required information to support the response, and
the manner in which response can develop as new opportunities
arise. The multi-threading of meaning in this example shows how
the ad hoc planning of incident response creates opportunities to
develop common ground between the community of practice. It
also provides an interesting insight into the challenges of defining
what information to record in the Incident Log, i.e., when to
convert the information to structured meaning.
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CLOSING THE INCIDENT
Once the incident has been resolved, the Officer will radio the
Controller with a final update that summarizes their assessment
of the incident and the actions taken. This narrative could be as
short as “One under arrest for drunk and disorderly – transporting
to Custody”, but may be more lengthy for complex incidents. The
Controller will add this final update to the incident log, which is
then closed.
DISCUSSION
We began this paper with the proposal that sensemaking, as
collaborative activity, is performed within a given community of
practice, operating with the constraints of its institutional frames
(which are both formal and informal rules of that community
and the technology used to support its activity). In the examples
presented in the paper, the rules are instantiated through the ways
in which the community of practice manages meaning. As the
examples show, the management of meaning is not a neat, linear
process but involves the participants raising questions, seeking
clarification, misinterpreting information and correcting their
understanding. We have used the notion of common ground
as a lens through which to consider this activity, but it is also
illustrates very nicely the cyclical nature of sensemaking in the
Data/Frame model (Klein et al., 2006a,b).
In the examples, the manner in which information is
communicated influences the ways in which meaning is
managed. For the Attending Officers, communication is almost
exclusively spoken, either via radio or face-to-face. This means
that Attending Officers tend to only know the content of
Incident Log when it is read to them by the Incident Controller.
In this case, macrocognition applies to the translation from
structured meaning to actionable meaning (i.e., from the entries
in the Incident Log to advice and instruction for Attending
Officers). As Clarke’s (1996) notion of common ground implies,
the macrocognition of incident response is a continual process
of comparing and contrasting across perceptual, linguistic,
community evidence. From another perspective, the notion of
Distributed Situation Awareness (Stanton et al., 2006) suggests
that teams will typically have different views on a situation, with
the possibility that their knowledge overlaps in part rather than
completely. This suggests that the macrocognition in incident
response relates to deciding what knowledge to share and what
format to use for its sharing. For example, the response to
the “intruder” shining a torch into someone’s window involved
sharing of knowledge of previous incidents from this address.
This ‘informal’ knowledge could be shared during the briefing
prior to patrols leaving the Police Station or could, as in this
instance, be shared over the radio. In this instance, the shared
knowledge became integral to the response, i.e., “we’ll go and
have a chat”. When this knowledge applies to the response, it
is formally recorded in the Incident Log. Otherwise, it remains
part of the informal ‘rules’ that play against the formal rules
for recording. The examples also highlight that the interplay of
formal and informal is not a simple matter of all entries in the
Incident Log having structured meaning, i.e., there are several
examples in which the content of the Incident Log is used to
challenge other entries; in such cases, the ‘formal’ (structured
meaning) of the Incident Log is replaced with an ‘informal’
(negotiated meaning). What is interesting here is that such
communication can occur even when a more appropriate channel
for informal communication is available, i.e., when Incident
Controllers are sitting near each other and can simply talk to each
other. This suggests that the notions of formal/informal rules,
or negotiated/structured meaning are neither rigid concepts to
apply to analysis nor necessarily factors consider in the choices
that Incident Controllers make.
In terms of limitations of the work, the use of a selection of
examples taken from a larger collection could raise accusations
of ‘cherry-picking’ those examples which best support the points
that we are making in the paper. It might have been beneficial
to report more examples, or to classify a large collection of
examples in terms of the issues identified in the paper. We feel
that the examples illustrate the individual nature of the incidents
that Police will be responding to. This means that collecting
more examples might not necessarily allow reduction to specific
types, and hence there is a need to consider individual cases.
On the other hand, in order to determine whether the unique
characteristics of a specific case can be generalized to similar
operations, there is a need to extend the set of examples that are
explored, and this could be the subject of subsequent work.
In terms of the lessons that these examples, and our analysis
of them, might raise, we believe that there are two lines of
exploration that could be developed. The first concerns the nature
of sensemaking as collaborative activity. Many of the case studies
that have been reported since Weick’s (1995) pioneering work
on sensemaking draw on analyses of discussions and meetings
in which groups make sense of the problems that they face.
Thus, there seems a strong case to be made for the proposal
that collaborative sensemaking follows the elements outlined
in this paper. However, the idea that there is an ‘informal’
sense which can be used to describe and define a situation only
covers part of the processes that sensemaking involves. For many
situations (and this is often critical in Emergency Response)
there is a parallel requirement to produce a ‘formal’ statement
of the response and this requires description of the situation in
terms which can be used to justify the use of resources. Baber
et al. (2006) describe how narratives are constructed to develop
the crime scene investigation from informal sensemaking to
formal reporting. The Incident Log, which is a formalized ‘in the
moment’ account of the incident response as a series of time-
stamped event updates which reflect the twists and turns of the
ongoing sensemaking process that took place during the incident.
The second line of exploration concerns that nature of the
technology and work processes followed in Incident Response.
As Manning (1988) notes, there is an ongoing tension between
the need to record a formal, reliable, and objective account of
the response, and the collaborative search after meaning, which
seems to arise spontaneously when groups of people engage in
sensemaking. One implication of this is the need to manage the
‘meaning’ of the incident as it unfolds, and to combine this with
the management of the incident itself. For us, this implies two
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 293
fpsyg-07-00293 March 8, 2016 Time: 12:31 # 11
Baber and McMaster Macrocognition in Incident Response
cycles of macrocognition which partially overlap. The first cycle
concerns the formal rules which govern the management of the
response, e.g., in terms of recording details in the Incident Log
and in terms of providing resources for the response. The second
concerns the informal rules which govern the operation of the
Community of Practice and support the managing of uncertainty
and risk as the incident unfolds. It is this overlap between these
two cycles of macrocognition which enables adaptability in the
ensuing response and which also the need to ensure that the
‘formal’ rules do not overwhelm the informal rules.
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